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1Corruption in the housing and municipal sector
Housing and municipal problems in Ukraine can be determined as a network of pressing 
and as yet unsolved political, economic, social, legal and industrial questions related to the 
granting of these services for citizens. The essence of these questions is that the majority 
of Ukraine’s citizens are physically unable to pay for housing and municipal services in full 
under those tariffs and prices dictated to them by the suppliers of these services. The causes 
for this are the low incomes and standard of living of the population on one hand, and the 
often over-estimated pseudo-market requirements of the monopolist service providers on the 
other.
The circumstance that nowadays the state takes the side not of the citizens, but of the housing 
and municipal monopolists complicates the situation. During last ten years, the state has 
avoided appropriate fulfi lment of its social function and necessary constitutional obligations 
to people. In effect, it has also transformed the Ukraine housing and municipal sector into 
one of the basic sources of illegal enrichment for a small group of people through ‘shadow’ 
gain of the profi t.
Signifi cant amounts from family budgets are washed away to pay for housing and municipal 
services, money that should go on meals, public health services, education, cultural and other 
purposes. At the same time, the situation complicates the fi nancial state of needy Ukrainian 
families even more. Many families are forced either not to pay at all, or to pay only a part 
of the amount that has been charged illegally. It causes the existence of so-called ‘debts’, 
allowing housing and municipal monopolists to pursue needy ‘debtors’ through the courts.
A signifi cant problem is the imperfect nature of the subsidies system (non-cash grants that 
are assigned to people with low income and which give them a possibility to have discounted 
rates on infrastructure services introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers, which has actually 
made the grant diffi cult to get by the majority of people who really need it. At the same time, 
those who do not in fact require the grant, are able to receive it.
According to communiques of the Antimonopoly Commission, all regions of Ukraine 
experience overstated reporting of required versus actual services delivered, distorted levels 
of service quality, non-transparent procedures of rates establishment, as well as other types 
of systematic illegal abuses. Nevertheless, these facts – which unambiguously point to the 
presence of organized and socially dangerous crimes in the housing and communal services 
sector – have drawn the attention of neither the public, nor local authorities, nor competent 
agencies unless it was pointed out by opposition polical parties.  
There is also a problem that providers of infrastructure services use the mechanism of 
bringing people who do not pay for their services (in most cases – people with low income) 
to court for non-payments. It happens at the time when no written agreements are concluded 
between inhabitants and providers of infrastructure services. It means that in spite of the fact 
that there is no formal legal ground to apply to the courts, providers usually win this kind of 
law cases and make people pay for their services. During this process there are numerous 
cases of violation of the basics of legal proceedings and investigations set in the Code of Civil 
Procedures of Ukraine. 
It is necessary to pay more attention to the question of disorganization of the courts’ normal 
work, as bodies of the government, which have been signifi cantly congested because of the 
number of claims from housing and municipal services.
1.
2An additional problem is the illegal switching-off of electricity, gas, heating and water supplies of 
needy households by the enterprises providing housing and communal services. Such practices 
are implemented contrary to chapters 22, 47 and 48 of the Constitution, and contrary to current 
legislation about a living wage and about the state social guarantees. In addition, such actions are 
actually an illegal encroachment of proper state functions, internal and international obligations of 
Ukraine, which under the Constitution is a social state.
There is a new and dangerous social and psychological phenomenon in the society, a result of 
psychological, judicial and other pressure upon the population regularly made during recent years 
by housing and municipal services. Experts determine it as a special kind of mental frustration 
– ‘housing and municipal depression’. 
Accordingly to data of an opinion poll conducted in 2006 by the Institute of Social and Political 
Psychology of Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, for the fi rst time since studies began 
in 1997 the main cause for popular participation in mass protests is universal, economic discontent 
– infringement of human rights, in particular, increases in payments for housing and transport, 
corruption in supervising organizations, abuses of authority by local management, and switching-
off of electricity, gas, heating and water supplies. Actually, all the listed motives for protest, more 
or less, concern the housing and municipal services. It is necessary therefore to work towards 
the elimination of different ‘shadow’ schemes of gaining extra profi ts (incorrect pricing, getting 
payment for non-productive work period of infrastructure (e.g. leaking pipe or absence of hot water 
supply), tax optimization etc), reduction of artifi cial non-productive expenses, the introduction of 
effective energy savings, the provision of an exact account of supplied services, introduction of new 
progressive technologies and the development of sound market competition.
These problems cannot be solved by extensive, constant and economically unreasonable increases 
in prices and tariffs, nor by illegally ‘beating out’ so-called ‘debts’ from the needy population; such 
practices lead only to its even greater complication. In spite of Government declaration on changes 
in infrastructure services, in fact there were no signifi cant changes in this sphere in 2006 and up 
to this time. It means that those who used to receive extra profi t through housing and municipal 
sector in certain cases will continue this practice. Hence citizens are demanding urgent answers 
to questions concerning legal relations of the state and its provision of housing and municipal 
services. It has become a national problem, having grounds to be considered one of the most 
important for the authorities, because it makes it impossible for Ukrainian citizens to use the rights 
guaranteed by the principal law. By failing to resolve this issue, there is a threat to the citizens’ vital 
interests, and consequently, to national safety.
At the international level, Ukraine has the image of a rather corrupt state, which is testifi ed to 
by its permanently low ratings as defi ned by the results of surveys carried out by authoritative 
international institutions in recent years. In particular, the index of corruption awareness (as 
surveyed by Transparency International) in Ukraine were as follows: in 2002 – 2.4, in 2003 – 2.3, in 
2004 – 2.2 and in 2005 – 2.6 (according to the survey methodology, states with a hazardous level 
of corruption include those with the index of up to 3).
The offi cial statistics keep records of corruptive offences defi ned as such by the law of Ukraine On 
Corruption Control. Annualy from 3,000 to 5,000 of corruption cases are reported and majority of 
the corruptive actions were done by public offi cers.
The most widespread corruptive actions are bribery. According to statistical data, during the last 
three years (2003-2005), legal advocacy agencies registered up to 3,000 bribery facts each year. 
At the same time, in 2005 only 398 persons were brought to justice for bribery.
According to offi cial statistical data, in 2006 there were 919 reported cases of corruption during 
offi cial employment activity, 151 criminal cases of bribes acceptance, and 1,684 cases that can 
3be classifi ed as corruptive, among which 35 cases were carried out by highest state offi cials of 
categories I-III (in Ukraine there are 7 categories of state offi cials where 1st category is the highest). 
Offi cial reprimands were assigned to 1,197 offi cials. 
 The ‘paying-off’ of persons authorized to perform functions of the state (‘corruptive lobbying’) has 
become widespread, as has the performance of illegal and corruptive intermediary functions by 
public offi cers in relations between third parties and public authorities, which has become not a 
situational but constant phenomenon. 
There are also other types of corruption. In particular, the hiring of relatives or friends, the receipt of 
‘commission fees’ from participants in state procurement procedures, non-offi cial ‘communication’ 
with representatives of enterprises and organizations dealing with administration or having 
contractual relations with public authorities, undertaking business through false persons or relatives, 
and receiving of illegal privileges or presents on dates of personal, state or religious holidays.
More particularly, there is the still complicated situation within Ukraine’s judicial authorities. 
Numerous facts on abuse and violations are registered at the stage of applying to the court and 
during judgement on cases. Since March 1998 the Higher Justice Council has applied to the the 
President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine to support the proposals for 
the dismissal of over 70 judges for violation of their oath, which has been satisfi ed accordingly.
The strategic direction of corruption control should be strengthening activity focused on revealing 
corruption, and ensuring prosecution of guilty persons. Effectiveness in detecting corruption can 
be achieved only through the close co-operation of legal advocacy agencies, public authorities 
and civic society institutes, as well as through the integrated undertaking of appropriate anti-
corruption measures. Moreover, implementation of anti-corruption activities should be ensured by 
adequate accountability mechanisms. Such an approach meets the basic principles of forming of 
anti-corruption strategies in the modern world.
1.1. Separate examples of corruption in the Ukrainian housing and municipal 
sector
a) In 2006 the Offi ce of the Public Prosecutor of Kyiv city has brought a criminal case against 
two heads of the organization Cable Networks of the ‘Kyivenergo’ Company, which provides 
the centralized power supply in Kyiv. These offi cials received a bribe of 50,000 UAH (10,000 
USD) from a cafe’s owner for non-ground approval of the design documentation for the cafe 
connection to the electric system. The criminal case mentioned chapter 2 of article 386 of the 
Criminal Code, prescribing from fi ve to ten years imprisonment1.
b) Until July 2006, the Kyiv Municipal Offi ce of Ground Resources blocked the receipt of 
documents determining borders of territories around the dwelling houses (by-house territories). 
These territories should be transmitted for free to housing communities. Instead, the Kyiv 
city administration supervized a society with limited liability ‘The Earth 2000’, which legalized 
unnecessary papers for 22,000 UAH2. 
1   Kyiv Prosecutor Offi ce; 24.05.2006; http://www.prokuror.kiev.ua/ua/media/statements/463.html)
2   Newspaper «Контраст» (Contrast); # 8(26), 23 March 2006; Kyiv)
c)  Another example of corrupt actions in Kyiv city relates to waste collection and removal. In relation 
to low tariffs for waste removal, the city authority gives indemnifi cation to enterprises contracted 
for removal. However, only companies that give bribes can be included in the list of preferred 
waste collection and removal provider. At the time when Kyiv faces lack of technical equipment 
for waste removal, the possibility to use all available resources from private providers are not 
used. Therefore carriers of waste confi rm that their technical equipment stands idle because of 
corruption schemes used on this market to receive indemnifi cation3. 
d)  One of the reasons for corrupt actions is the imperfect situation of grants for separate categories 
of citizens for expenses compensation for payment of housing and municipal services. For the 
grant legalization, applicants should provide the following documents: an application for receipt 
of the housing grant, a certifi cate about family members and the size of payment for housing and 
municipal services, a certifi cate about income for the six last months, and a certifi cate about the 
size of the ground area. Besides, it is also necessary to have passports, a pension certifi cate, 
and labour books for unemployed family members, municipal services pay books, evidence 
of actual payment for electric power and the heat supply for the previous period, and medical 
certifi cates. Depending on circumstances, on demand of the grant offi cial it may be necessary to 
provide additional documents as well. Such a complex procedure often leads to bribery in cases 
where the set of documents is incomplete.
e)  Zhytomyr Regional Offi ce of Anti-monopoly Committee of Ukraine instituted proceedings against 
Zhytomyrgas JSC, based on signs of misuse of its monopoly situation i.e. the enterprise included 
in its rates for services the cost of needless additional work4.
3   Newspaper «Имею Право» (I have the Right); # 7, 1- 7 March 2006.; Kyiv)
4   Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine, 24.11.2006;  
    http://amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=63204&cat_id=64109 
52. Legal aspects of the the fi ght against corruption 
in Ukraine
2.1 The basic acts and defi nitions
The basic acts of Ukrainian regulatory procedures and mechanisms employed in the fi ght 
against corruption in the housing and municipal sector are:
The law of Ukraine ‘On the Fight Against Corruption’ (1995)
The Criminal Code of Ukraine (2001)
The Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (1984)
The law of Ukraine ‘On Protection of the Rights of Consumers’ (1991)
The law of Ukraine ‘On Housing and Municipal Services’ and other normative-legal acts 
of Ukraine (2004)
The term ‘corruption’ is defi ned in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Fight Against Corruption’ (1995). 
Corruption is understood to be activity of people authorized for performance of functions 
of the state, which is directed towards illegal use of this authority for reception of material 
benefi ts, services, privileges or other advantages. Corruptive actions are: 
a) Illegal receipt by a person authorized for performance of functions of the state, in 
connection with performance of such functions, of material benefi ts, services, privileges 
or other advantages, including acceptance or receipt of services by their purchase at a 
price signifi cally lower than their actual cost; and 
b) Receipt by a person authorized for performance of functions of the state, of credits or 
loans, securities, real estate or other property through the use of privileges or advantages, 
not provided for by the current legislation. 
Recently, questions about the fi ght against corruption in Ukraine have come under signifi cant 
attention. The President of Ukraine signed the law ‘About Modifi cations in the Law of Ukraine 
On the Fight Against Corruption’, and this was adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine on 
February 23, 2006. According to these changes, the prime minister, the fi rst vice prime 
minister, vice prime ministers, ministers, deputies of regional councils and service persons 
of the armed forces of Ukraine are also all liable for corruption actions. Broadening the list of 
liable position holders gives a basis for a reduction in the number of infringements.
In 2006, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine developed a draft concept to combat corruption 
named ‘On a Way to Respectability’. This project was approved by the governmental 
Committee on Legal Policy and Defense. The concept forms the grounds of the state policy 
with regard to its fi ght against corruption. The draft has been approved by the Council of 
Europe. At the time of this report preparation, the draft had been approved by the ministries 
and departments and was to be sent for approval to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The necessity to develop and adopt normative and legal acts as part of the fi ght against 
corruption is based on the fact that corruption continues to remain one of major factors in 
Ukraine, and it is one which infl uences essentially the entire structure of national safety and 
social activity.
Complex work against corruption includes improving anti-corruption legislation, personnel 
selection, co-ordinating the actions of law enforcement bodies and essential improvement of 
the activities of the courts.
•
•
•
•
•
62.2 Responsibility for corruption and the forms it takes
Corruption is one of the essential negative phenomena that prevent Ukraine from appropriate 
economic and social development. The country’s anti-corruption legislation started developing 
in the middle of the 1990s, when the law ‘On the Fight against Corruption’ was adopted (1995; 
changes and additions: 1996-2005). Since that time, Ukraine has moved towards the development 
and introduction of anti-corruption standards in conformity with conventional global ones. These 
standards are highlighted in laws and legal acts, and concepts and programmes; they are revealed 
through creation of specialized state institutions, which have enough authority to act against 
corruption. As a result, it has been possible to achieve certain successes in the fi ght against 
corruption (especially in its most dangerous criminal forms) – in 2003, there were 4,918 reports on 
corruption actions forwarded to the courts.
In spite of positive changes, the effi ciency of the fi ght against corruption remains insuffi cient. 
According to domestic and international organizations engaged in research on corruption, its level 
in Ukraine is highly signifi cant. Ukraine also has a tendency to delay in conducting social and legal 
actions against corruption in comparison to quantity indicators of the corruption level. 
The following kinds of responsibility for corruption offences currently exist in Ukraine:
administrative
civil and legal
disciplinary, including fi nancial 
criminal and legal
2.3 Problems preventing corruption in economic activities
Creation of an effecient prevention system against corruption in the sector of economic activities 
is one of the most signifi cant problems of Ukrainian society, and it is an extremely important and 
diffi cult issue to solve. Recently, a lot has been done with this in mind: the Co-ordinating Committee 
on the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crimes was formed by the President of Ukraine 
(1993), the National Program on the Fight against Corruption (1997), the Criminal code of Ukraine 
(2001) was developed and accepted, while a number of other legislative and organizational actions 
have also been introduced. All these measures are aimed at counteracting corruption as a whole. 
However, they are practically unable to tackle corruption in separate sectors, which makes these 
measures less effi cient and should be considered as their certain drawback.
An analysis of current legislation shows that no statutory act contains lists unequivocally outlining 
anti-corruption measures in the sector of economic activities. Only in the most general terms, 
chapter 5 of the law ‘On Fight against Corruption’ hints that in economic activities it is possible to 
recognize as corruption: 
• assistance, use of the service position, to physical persons and legal entities in realization of 
enterprise activity by them and also in reception of subsidies, subventions, grants, credits or 
privileges with the purpose of illegal receipt of material benefi ts, services, privileges or other 
advantages; 
• carrying out enterprise activity directly or through intermediaries or fi gureheads; and 
• participating independently (except for cases when the civil servant shares co-management, of 
the enterprises that belong to the state, and represents interests of the state in a Supervisory 
Council or a Revision Committee of an enterprise), or through a representative or fi gureheads 
in Management Boards or other executive bodies of the enterprises, fi nancial establishments, 
companies and similar organizations, unions, associations, co-operative societies which conduct 
business activity. 
•
•
•
•
7The Criminal Code of Ukraine (except for ‘classical’ corruption chapters: 368 – ‘Reception of a 
bribe’ and 369 – ‘Granting of a bribe’) considers in section V – ‘Crimes in the sector of economic 
activities’ conditional corruption to include actions such as: 
• counteraction of lawful economic activities (chapter 206 CC); 
• illegal opening or use of currency accounts outside from Ukraine (chapter 208 CC); and 
• legalization (laundering) of incomes received through criminal means (chapter 209 CC) and 
some others. 
The above-mentioned anti-corruption actions in the sector of economic activities are local – that is, 
such ones that do not solve the problem as a whole. Preventing corruption in economic activities 
should consist of the complex of actions, namely political, economic, legal, organizational-
administrative and social-psychological ones.
2.4 Consumer rights guaranteed by the Law of Ukraine On Housing and 
Municipal Services
The law defi nes the grounds for organizational and economic relations arising in the sector of 
granting and usage of housing and municipal services. 
A consumer has the right:
to receive housing and municipal services in due time and of corresponding quality under treaty 
provisions on granting of housing and municipal services;
to receive the necessary information about all housing and municipal services, their costs, 
structure of pricing, rates of consumption and so on;
for compensation for damage caused by unaccordance in housing and municipal services;
for elimination of the revealed defi ciencies of granting housing and municipal services during the 
term established by the contract;
for payment reductions for rendered services in case of their unaccordance in full or decreases 
in their quality; and
to receive indemnifi cation from the executor for excess of normative terms on carrying out 
abnormal condition-renewal works.
Municipal services are provided for consumers constantly; exceptions include breaks for resolution 
of accidents, and for carrying out repairs and preventive works under the schedule agreed with 
an agency of the local authorities. Local authorities have the right to change temporarily rates of 
consumption, quality of granting of housing and municipal services according to technical capacity 
of the enterprises, climatic and other local conditions.
•
•
•
•
•
•

93. Public organizations and their struggle to reform housing 
and municipal services
According to Ukrainian citizens’ opinions, the problem surrounding the organization and 
quality of housing and municipal work in the country is a major issue. Hence citizens have 
united to form voluntary organizations of consumers with the intention of protecting their 
rights.
In Ukraine, 4,000 unions of co-owners of apartment houses have been founded. During the 
fi rst three months of 2006 alone, there were 254 unions founded. This represents six per cent 
of the total quantity of houses with more than fi ve fl oors. The biggest number of unions are 
being created in the Nikolaev region.
According to Ukrainian legislation, an association of consumers has the right:
To carry out interviews to assess public opinions concerning price and quality of 
services;
To organize legal and advisory help for consumers;
To represent and protect the interests of consumers within local authorities;
To apply to the courts in any cases of illegal actions on the part of a manufacturer; and
To conduct public hearings on the subject of housing and municipal services.
The most successful non-governmental organization (NGO) helping to further citizens 
rights protection in the housing and municipal services sector is Housing and Municipal 
Inspection of Our Ukraine, which was created in 2005 by the political party Our Ukraine. This 
NGO carries out its activities in different directions. A telephone centre, The Hot Line, was 
created to collect information from citizens and to provide consultations concerning housing 
and municipal services. In each area of Kyiv city, mobile inspection brigades have been 
established to conduct daily spot-checks on city streets and to communicate with citizens. A 
special brochure, For the Protection of Kyivans’ Rights, is published with recommendations 
for the population concerning the protection of their housing and municipal rights. The NGO 
also publishes The Bulletin of Housing and Municipal Inspection of Our Ukraine and develops 
typical forms for complaints, claims and statements when making a claim. 
It was under the initiative Housing and Municipal Inspection of Our Ukraine that the 
associations of co-owners of apartment houses were founded in Kyiv. Such activity helps to 
reduce the level of corruption in the housing and municipal sector.
According to a piece of analytical research conducted by the Association of Cities and 
Communities of Ukraine (AUC), a national association of local and regional authorities, the 
attributes of the corruption in Ukraine are: 
A strengthening of tolerant attitudes to corruption within society combined with a recognition 
of corruption in the public conscience, public harm and readiness to choose corruptive 
ways for solving problems, which has resulted in a disability on the part of citizens to 
participate actively in anti-corruption activities; and
Weakness of civic society institutes. The mass media, which are usually infl uenced by 
their owners and public authorities, mainly avoid objective coverage of such problems. 
Civic initiatives are not supported, due to social apathy on the part of the majority of 
the population. Non-governmental organizations, meanwhile, are mostly repressed and 
subordinate to the individuals or organizations that provide their fi nancial support.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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4. Attitudes to the problem of corruption in the housing and 
municipal economy in Ukraine: a report on the results of a 
sociological study
4.1 Introduction
This case study of corruption in the housing and municipal economy (HME) in Ukraine 
included homeowners, HME experts and workers to gain insight into different aspects of 
the problem outlined above. The fi eldwork stage of the interviews with homeowners was 
conducted during March 2006. Analysis of the results was conducted using the ‘triangulation’ 
method.5
For the interviews with homeowners, adult citizens (aged over 18 years) were selected by 
the random multi-stage sample6 method as follows – inhabitants of Kyiv (150 homeowners), 
Rivne (50) and Kherson (50). These cities represent different regions of Ukraine – the centre, 
north-west and south-east of the country, and from territorial and administrative point of view 
they are considered as the country’s regional centres. This selection of cities and the random 
selection of respondents sought to provide thoughts and experiences with the domestic HME 
typical for entire population of Ukraine, so that the results might be propaged correspondingly 
to the wider general population.
Women participants of the study represented 54.4 per cent, while men represented 45.6 per 
cent. More than half of those interviewed considered themselves to be religious (51.2 per 
cent) and more than half had participated in higher education (58.8 per cent). Almost 17 per 
cent of those interviewed were workers, 12.8 per cent lived on their savings, money transfers 
or their pension, and 11.2 per cent were hired employees of business organizations. The 
distribution of respondents with respect to age and sex as a whole refl ects these social-
demographic characteristics of the adult urban population of Ukraine – thus, the results of the 
investigation can be extended to entire general population (see Table 1).
Interviews were carried out by speaking to homeowners individually using a form containing 
open and closed questions. The form included personal information about the respondent 
(sex, age, religion, education, basic sources of earning a living, level of welfare, condition of 
their homes), level and quality of services, experiences with HME representatives, corruption 
in the region, their understanding of indicators of corrupt actions of regional representatives 
and users of its services, and their estimation of the effectiveness of possible ways of 
overcoming corruption in domestic HME.
5 Triangulation is the application and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon;
6 Multistage random sample is constructed by taking a series of simple random samples in stages for example 
in the fi rst stage a random sample would be conducted of large area. In the second stage, a random sample of 
smaller areas (such as regions) is conducted. Then, in the third stage, a random sample of even smaller areas 
(such as neighborhoods) is taken from within each of the areas chosen in the second stage.
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The survey for infrastructure service providers was conducted on the basis of random selection 
among the representatives of the service providers’ management and regular staff workers of 
ZHEKs (the local residential utilities offi ces), companies that supply energy (oblenergo), gas 
(citygas), heating (teploenergo), regional suppliers of water (oblvodokanal) and companies that 
collect waste in Kyiv, Rivne and Kherson.
Discussions in focus groups were conducted according to the following blocks of questions: service 
delivery, corruption and livelihoods. Those involved in the focus groups included representatives of 
infrastructure services providers, independent experts and representatives of NGOs. 
In order to check the reliability of the interview results, the interviewer had to personally prepare 
a report on housing and municipal services to be given to each of the interviewed homeowners 
afterwards (on the condition of the house, water pipes, pavements, canalization and drainage, 
utilization of household trash and so on).
4.2 Estimation of the quality of housing and municipal services 
The results of this opinion poll in the three cities (Kyiv, Rivne and Kherson) provide a picture of the 
quality of housing and municipal services.
The interviewed homeowners were suffi ciently pessimistic in evaluations of their infl uence on the 
city authority. Hence, to the question ‘As you consider, will your opinion be heard on the solution of 
the city authority?’ 61.2 per cent of respondents answered ‘no’, 20.8 per cent could not answer this 
question and only 18 per cent answered affi rmatively.
Only half of those interviewed (49.6 per cent) feel themselves to be physically safe in their 
accommodation, while 42 per cent do not feel safe. 35.2 per cent consider that there is a threat to 
their health where they live (50 per cent deny this threat). 82.8 per cent of respondents indicated 
they never felt threatened by eviction because of migration of either landowners or organizers 
or by property developers. At the time of the interviews, 13.2 per cent had had this unfortunate 
experience.
Of the respondents, 77.6 per cent noted that their houses were located near their place of work, 
transport, medical and educational institutions and other establishments of social welfare. Another 
20 per cent refuted this assertion. In the opinion of half of those interviewed, they are able to 
obtain a bank loan; at the same time, 35.2 per cent were deprived of this possibility. Answering the 
question ‘How in the past did you overcome a crisis such as the loss of job?’, 44.8 per cent of those 
interviewed indicated that in such a case they searched for new work, and 11.2 per cent turned for 
help to relatives.
Table 1. Distribution of respondents accordingly to age
Age group Number of people %
24 or younger 39 15.6%
25-34 66 24.6%
35-49 61 24.4%
50-59 49 19.6%
60 or older 32 12.8%
No answer 3 1.2%
Total 250 100.0%
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Analyzing the quality of housing and municipal services: 60 per cent respondents noted they were 
satisfi ed by the water supply (against 39.6 per cent dissatisfi ed); 81.2 per cent were satisfi ed by 
the electric power supply (against 18.2 per cent not); 68 per cent – by transport services (against 
32 per cent not); and 63.2 per cent by the quality of canalization services (against 34.4 per cent 
dissatisfi ed).
At the same time, 52.4 per cent respondents noted that they were not satisfi ed with access to 
and quality of water (against 44.4 per cent of those satisfi ed); 81.2 per cent were not satisfi ed 
with the quality of roads, routes and pavements (against 18 per cent satisfi ed); and 63.6 per cent 
were dissatisfi ed by street lighting (against 36 per cent satisfi ed). Of those intereviewed, 53.6 per 
cent do not have access to rail services and 16.8 per cent are not satisfi ed by the quality of these 
services. Thus, for service users, the most urgent problems in the housing and municipal economy 
are roads, street lighting, water supply and the condition of water pipes (see Figure 1).
Water-pipe
39.6%
Water
44.4%
Transport
68%
Street 
illumination
36%
Railway
29.2%
Roads and
pavement
18%
Sewerage
63.2%
Electricity
81. 2%
Figure 1. Percentage of homeowners in the three regions satisfi ed by the 
quality of housing and municipal services
Also, respondents’ answers to the question ‘Have you been in contact with the suppliers of housing 
and municipal services?’ testify that in spite of dissatisfaction with the quality of HME services, 
homeowners are inclined to occupy a passive position when it comes to their rights (52.4 per cent 
gave negative answer to this question). Of those interviewed, 58.5 per cent noted that in cases of 
their turning to HME services with complaints, their problems had not been solved (against 20 per 
cent whose problems were successfully resolved).
In regard to the frequency of homeowners making applications to the suppliers of housing and 
municipal services, 38 per cent noted that in the previous year such application happened only 
once; 21.2 per cent been in contact less than one time per month, while 11.2 per cent had made 
applications once per month. Having turned to HME services, more than half of those interviewed 
(55.2 per cent) were not satisfi ed by staff behaviour (against 16.4 per cent of those satisfi ed).
Respondents had to range problems with the housing and municipal economy accordingly to 
importance. More than half (53.6 per cent) gave priority to fi nding a solution for the problem of 24-
hour water supply, including hot water (in a question with the joint alternatives). Second in terms 
of importance (27.2 per cent) was the problem of heat supply, with power supply third. To the 
direct question ‘Do you consider that you have enough information about housing and municipal 
infrastructure services?’ 65.6 per cent said ‘no’, while only 18.4 per cent answered ‘yes’.
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4.3 Estimation of the problem of corruption in the housing and municipal 
sector
With respect to the study topic, the questionnaire contained an open question ‘how do you 
understand corruption?’ The generalized analysis of the respondents’ answers demonstrated the 
majority of citizens (44.8 per cent) understand the word ‘corruption’ to be use of an offi cial position 
for that offi cial’s own needs; 17.2 per cent consider corruption to be the assignment of a bribe to 
a civil agent or offi cial; 13.6 per cent – obtaining pay for services that should be provided free of 
charge; and 11.2 per cent – illegal activity directed toward the awarding of property. 
Having made their determination of corruption, respondents had to give practical examples of 
this phenomenon. Although more than a third respondents could not give any example at all, 
13.6 per cent mentioned corruption with obtaining permissions, licenses, certifi cations and other 
documents, while 10 per cent gave the example of having repair work undertaken. In the opinion of 
respondents, the state power bodies suffer the most from corruption (78.4 per cent). Respondents 
also recognized corruption as a serious problem in business (34.8 per cent), education (32.0 per 
cent) and in non-governmental organizations (10.8 per cent).
According to the opinion of the homeowners interviewed, the basic reasons for corruption are low 
earnings (20.4 per cent), greediness for money (13.6 per cent), a feature of human nature (13.2 
per cent), impunity, the possibility of avoiding punishment for corrupt behaviour (12.8 per cent), 
absence of moral barriers (11.2 per cent), imperfect legislation (9.6 per cent), and the impossibility 
of government organizations in exerting proper control over corruption (9.2 per cent) (see Table 
2).
Table 2. Basic reasons for corruption in the housing and municipal economy
Reason for corruption
Quantity of respondents selecting 
this answer
Number of 
people
%
Special feature of psyche (human nature) 33 13.2%
Possibility of avoiding punishment 32 12.8%
Absence of moral barriers 28 11.2%
Imperfect legislation 24 9.6%
Low living standards (low earnings) 51 20.4%
Impossibility of government bodies in exerting 
proper control over corruption
23 9.2%
Low level of legal awareness of citizens 5 2.0%
Greediness for money 34 13.6%
Don’t know 17 6.8%
Others 3 1.2%
Total 250 100%
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For analysis of the special features of corruption when it comes to providing specifi c housing and 
municipal services, respondents had to select the services that were connected, in their opinion, 
with the highest levels of corruption (this was an open question). According to this generalized 
data, the greatest corruption is inherent in housing administration (19.2 per cent), the services of 
water and heat supply (12 per cent), the suppliers of electric power (9.2 per cent) and in the local 
authority, which is responsible for the distribution of available housing, providing lands for building 
construction and so forth (7.6 per cent). Of those interviewed, 12.4 per cent indicated corruption 
was inherent in all HME sectors to the same extent (see Table 3).
Table 3. Distribution of specifi c housing and municipal services accordingly to the level 
of corruption of their suppliers
Suppliers of housing and municipal services
Quantity of respondents selecting 
this answer
Number of 
people
%
Housing administration 48 19.2 %
Local authority 19 7.6 %
Repair and transport organizations 14 5.6 %
Suppliers of water and heat 30 12.0 %
Suppliers of electric power 23 9.2 %
All suppliers in the same size 31 12.4 %
Suppliers of gas 5 2.0 %
Don’t know 80 32.0 %
Total 250 100 %
Of those interviewed, 42.8 per cent said that in the previous year they themselves or their friends 
had been required to bribe suppliers of one or other of the housing and municipal services (against 
46.4 per cent who gave a negative answer). In regard to the form of bribe required, 29.6 per cent 
noted that the supplier of the service asked for the bribe directly, 21.2 per cent were guided by 
persuasion – ‘all they knew was that it was necessary to pay somewhat more’, while 10 per cent of 
respondents obtained a proposal to pay bribe from a third party.
To the question ‘What would happen if you did not pay the bribe?’, 48 per cent indicated that they 
would have had a delay or refusal of service; 31.2 per cent said the quality of the service would 
have been considerably worse; and 18.8 per cent said that there would not any difference in service 
quality. Of those interviewed, 49 per cent indicated that on average citizens must pay a bribe once 
a year; 36.6 per cent said monthly; 5.2 per cent said each week; and 6.4 per cent said on average 
citizens must pay a bribe each day. The average size of bribe in the housing and municipal sector 
is from 10 to 100 UAH (US$2- $20) (according to 31.2 per cent of those interviewed).
According to the opinions of the homeowners interviewed, if the supplier of one or other housing and 
municipal service is recognized as being guilty of corruption, 24.4 per cent believe he/she receives 
no punishment; 20 per cent of respondents indicated the possibility of the corrupt individual losing 
his/her job; 10.4 per cent that he/she would lose their job and pay penalty; and 9.2 per cent that the 
corrupt person would lose their job and be imprisoned (see Table 4).
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Table 4. Possible consequences of housing and municipal services supplier being 
convicted of bribery
Possible consequences
Number of respondents selecting 
this answer
People %
Lose job and be imprisoned 23 9.2 %
Lose job and pay penalty 26 10.4 %
Lose job 50 20.0 %
Depends on service provided 73 29.2 %
No punishment 61 24.4 %
Don’t know 17 6.8 %
Total 250 100 %
Of those interviewed, 12.4 per cent indicated that the payment of bribes refl ects positively on 
homeowners and the condition of their accommodations, since the quality of the services provided 
after payment of a bribe is considerably better. However, 10.8 per cent of respondents believe 
that precisely through the payment of bribes, the quality of housing and municipal services is low, 
while 9.6 per cent consider that the payment of bribes leads to changes in attitudes with respect to 
homeowners from the point of view of the suppliers of housing and municipal services. According 
to the opinion of 35.2 per cent, the payment of bribes has no effect, while 20 per cent could not give 
answer to the question.
To the question ‘What do you feel as a result of experiences of corruption?’ half of the respondents 
(50 per cent) indicated feeling powerlessness; 21.2 per cent – fear and confusion; and 12 per cent 
– ill will towards the pepetrators. At the same time, 8 per cent indicated having no strong feelings, 
since corruption is considered to be a usual phenomenon.
Further, respondents had to estimate what actions against corruption are effective (or ineffective) in 
their opinion. In order to estimate a methods’ effectiveness, the following examples were proposed 
to respondents:
pursuit and prolonged imprisonment of those engaged in corruption;
public information about the activities of public bodies and the cost of budget expenditure from 
taxation;
information about investigations into corruption cases;
conducting campaigns directed toward focusing public attention on corruption and estimating its 
real cost for society;
assertion and observance of a professional ethics code (which, naturally, would exclude 
corruption and bribery);
actualization of moral and ethical values in society;
increasing the wages of civil servants / public offi cials;
granting to citizens the possibility of reporting corruption to the authorities;
protecting citizens who speak out against corruption (whistle-blowers);
creating a special state body to work against corruption in the power sector; and
business activity directed toward the fi ght against corruption.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Being guided by the study results, it is possible to note the most effective method, in the opinion of 
respondents, is pursuit and prolonged imprisonment of those engaged in corruption activity (62.4 
per cent) and also the actualization of moral and ethical standards in society (59.2 per cent). At 
the same time, methods the respondents believed to have little effect are business activity directed 
toward the fi ght against corruption (83.6 per cent); the assertion and observance of a professional 
ethics code (73.2 per cent); an increase in the wages of civil agents (69.6 per cent); and conducting 
campaigns directed toward focusing public attention on corruption and estimating its real cost 
for society (68 per cent). Methods that are also ineffective, in the opinion of respondents: public 
information about the activities of public bodies and the cost of budget expenditure from taxation 
(64.8 per cent); measures protecting citizens who speak out against corruption (61.6 per cent); 
and granting to citizens the possibility of reporting corruption to the authorities (58 per cent). With 
regard to the creation of a special state body in the power sector to work against corruption, such 
a measure would also be ineffective (according to 52.4 per cent) (see Table 5).
Thus, the homeowners interviewed, as a whole, are pessimistic in their evaluation of potential 
methods to fi ght corruption in society – indeed only two of the 11 proposed methods were 
acknowledged to be effective. The average value of all the proposed methods’ effectiveness was 
only 37.9 per cent, with ineffectiveness valued at 62.1 per cent.
Table 5. Respondents’ estimation of the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of proposed 
anti-corruption methods, %
Methods of fi ghting corruption effective ineffective
Pursuit and prolonged imprisonment those 
engaging in corruption
62.4 % 37.6 %
Public information about the activities of public 
bodies and the cost of budget expenditure from 
taxation
35.2 % 64.8 %
Information about investigations into corruption 
cases
26.8 % 73.2 %
Conducting campaigns directed toward focusing 
public attention on corruption and estimates of its 
real cost to society
32.0 % 68.0 %
Assertion and observance of a code of 
professional ethics, which would exclude 
corruption and bribery)
26.8 % 73.2 %
Actualization of moral and ethical values in society 59.2 % 40.8 %
Increasing the wages of civil servants / public 
offi cials
30.4 % 69.6 %
Granting to citizens the possibility of reporting 
corruption to the authorities
42.0 % 58.0 %
Protection of citizens who speak out against 
corruption
38.4 % 61.6 %
Creation of a special state body in the power 
sector to fi ght corruption
47.6 % 52.4 %
Business activity directed toward the fi ght against 
corruption
16.4 % 83.6 %
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4.4 External estimation of the condition of the housing and municipal 
economies of the respondents
In order to guarantee the reliability of the data obtained, the interviewer immediately fi lled in an 
observation checklist following the interview. This contained information about the condition of 
the house and surrounding territory, the presence of public telephones, mailboxes, numbers on 
the houses and so forth. Another part of the observation checklist contained information about 
the provision of housing and municipal services, the presence of water pipes, pumps, fi lters and 
reservoirs with water, notice boards for announcements, the quality of sewerage and drainage, 
roads, paths, pavements, illumination and appearance of the streets, utilization of household trash 
and the presence of social welfare establishments.
Accordingly, the interviewers estimated the condition of the majority of the houses to be mediocre 
(56.8 per cent). The condition of other houses was evaluated in almost the same proportions to be 
either good (21.2 per cent) or poor (22 per cent). Hence the territory around the majority of houses 
was found to be mainly mediocre (58 per cent), but in almost a third of cases, poor (29.6 per cent). 
In 54 per cent cases, the homeowners lived in brick houses, and in 39.6 per cent of cases in panel 
ones. The level of public telephones available for the houses’ inhabitants was unsatisfactory in 
more than 50 per cent of cases, but was somewhat better in terms of the availability of mailboxes 
(62 per cent) and numbers on houses (91.2 per cent). The overwhelming majority of houses do not 
have boards for posting announcements (49.2 per cent).
In the majority of cases (94.8 per cent), the interviewed homeowners had a water pipe; however, 
only 10.8 per cent had water tanks and 19.6 per cent had fi lters to refi ne water for drinking. The 
interviewers did not note any illegal wipe pipe connections. In 60.4 per cent of cases they found 
neither undesirable constructions (such as overfi lled septic reservoirs or blocked collectors) nor any 
perceptible unpleasant odours. On the other hand, interviewers admitted a lack of public restrooms 
(in 76 per cent cases) and attempts to clean clogged sewers in only 20.4 per cent of cases.
In the majority of the cases, the houses had separate access routes and pavements for pedestrians 
(70.4 per cent). The movement of automobiles and pedestrians around the houses was found 
to be averagely busy (52 per cent and 62 per cent cases respectively). At the same time, the 
state of the pavements and roads was found to be unsatisfactory (52 per cent and 57.2 per cent 
respectively).
The overwhelming majority of houses are connected to the power supply network (89.6 per cent), 
while the same number of homeowners have electricity meters. Interviewers observed that 61.6 per 
cent of houses did not have suffi cient illumination in the evening and at night.
In the majority of cases (74.8 per cent) there were suffi cient rubbish bins on the streets around the 
houses, and the streets appeared to be tidy and cleaned fairly often. In 47.2 per cent cases, the 
interviewers even observed cleaners on the streets. 70 per cent of respondents hadnt seen rubbish 
on the streets. In almost half of cases (49.6 per cent) the observers found evidence of regular 
rubbish collections; however, only 3.2 per cent indicated that the collection of rubbish occured in a 
way to allow recycling.
At the same time, the streets around the houses were noted to be without proper drainage (58.4 per 
cent cases), while drains were cleaned rarely (in 45.6 per cent of cases) or not cleaned at all (27.2 
per cent). Because of this, streets frequently fl ood (51.6 per cent), as do houses in some cases 
(21.6 per cent). Road surfaces are poor (40 per cent) or generally absent (24.4 per cent).
Of the interviewers, 70.4 per cent indicated that respondents had access to social welfare 
establishments such as polyclinics, educational institutions, commercial centres, religious buildings 
etc. – the state of these accommodations was evaluated to be good or satisfactory in 65 per cent 
cases. In 68.6 per cent cases, local residents use these establishments frequently or fairly often.
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4.5 Different attitudes towards corruption from inhabitants of different 
regions of Ukraine
Conducting studies in large cities of different regions of Ukraine, employing identical procedures 
and with the use of the same method of selecting respondents and tools (questionnaire) permits a 
comparison of corruption in the housing and municipal sector according to regional distribution. 
Although the small sample size does not permit accomplishing a statistically signifi cant estimation 
of the interdependences of those or other indicators, it suffi ces to focus attention on such regional 
differences as the opinions of respondents. 
Inhabitants of Kherson were pessimistic in their evaluation of the possibility of infl uencing the city 
authority: 78 per cent of Khersonians indicated their opinion would not be heard when it came to 
such decision-making. At the same time, the corresponding proportion among inhabitants of Rivne 
was 50 per cent and in Kyiv, 59.3 per cent. In Kherson, a majority of respondents turned to the 
suppliers of public services to solve a specifi c problem (62 per cent), while in Rivne only 16 per 
cent did so (see Figure 2).
Since the study concerns corruption, regional differences (in terms of citizens’ attitudes) with 
regard to this social phenomenon were examined separately. It turned out that in Kyiv corruption is 
understood to be the assignment of a bribe to a public offi cial more often than in other regions; in 
Rivne, meanwhile, obtaining fee for a service that should be free of charge was the more common 
interpretation (see Figure 3). Obviously, such differences are caused by the kind of corrupt actions 
inhabitants encounter most frequently.
Inhabitants of Kherson consider housing administration workers, suppliers of water and heat, 
and also electric power and gas suppliers to be the most corrupt. Inhabitants of Rivne note the 
extraordinary corruption of the local authority, and Kyivians emphasize corruption of all suppliers of 
housing and municipal services without exception (see Figure 4).
Inhabitants of Kherson consider the possibility of avoiding punishment to be the main reason for 
corruption, while inhabitants of Rivne consider this to be absence of moral and ethical barriers. 
Figure 2. Distribution of homeowners who turned to the suppliers of the 
housing services to solve a specifi c problem
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Figure 3. ‘How do you understand word ‘corruption’?’
Figure 4. ‘In your opinion, which housing and municipal services 
suppliers are the most corrupt?’
Inhabitants of Kyiv are more likely to consider low earnings and greediness for money on the part 
of offi cials to be the main reason for corruption (see Figure 5). Thus, for the inhabitants of the 
capital, the reasons for corruption are more frequently material ones, while for the provincial cities’ 
inhabitants these reasons have more moral and ethical roots.
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Figure 5. ‘What do you consider to be the main reason for corruption in society?’
Inhabitants of Kherson encountered requests or requirements for a bribe to be paid most 
frequently in the case of the provision of services – 54 per cent of interviewed homeowners living 
in the city experienced such requests. Offi cials proved to be less corrupt in Kyiv (40.7 per cent of 
respondents had been asked to pay a bribe in the previous year) and Rivne (38 per cent had had 
this experience).
In the opinion of the majority of those interviewed in Kyiv, for an average citizen it is necessary to 
pay bribes to the suppliers of housing and municipal services about once a year (46 per cent of 
respondents). At the same time, for the inhabitants of Kherson and Rivne it is considered necessary 
to pay bribes considerably more frequently – ie, monthly (56 per cent and 52 per cent respectively 
believed this to be the case).
Figure 6. ‘Have you or a friend been requested by a representative of any body, 
organization or individual to pay him/her a bribe during the last year?’
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Respondents’ estimation of the most effective anti-corruption methods also had specifi c regional 
differences. Thus, practically all interviewed inhabitants of Kherson considered the pursuit and 
prolonged imprisonment of those engaged in corruption to be most justifi ed in overcoming corruption 
in the housing and municipal sector (96 per cent). They also consider actualizing moral and ethical 
values in society and granting to citizens the possibility of reporting corruption to the authorities to 
be effective (86 per cent and 64 per cent respectively).
The majority of Kyivians also considered pursuit and imprisonment of corrupt individuals to be an 
effective method in fi ghting corruption (59.3 per cent), indicating also expediency of actualization 
of moral and ethical values (54.0 per cent) and the need to create a special state body to fi ght 
corruption in the power sector (52.7 per cent). The inhabitants of Rivne were less optimistic about 
possible methods for overcoming corruption: none of the proposed methods was evaluated by a 
majority of respondents to be effective. Of the respondents, 48 per cent estimated that actualizing 
moral and ethical values in society would be effective, while 38 per cent selected pursuit and 
prolonged imprisonment of the corrupt, protection of citizens speaking out against corruption, and 
the creation of a special state body to fi ght corruption in the power sector (see Table 6).
Figure 7. ‘How frequently, in your opinion, it is necessary for average 
citizen to pay a bribe to someone?’
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Table 6. Regional distribution of respondents recognizing potential anti-corruption 
methods to be effective, %
Method of fi ght against corruption Kyiv Kherson Rivne
Three 
regions
Pursuit and prolonged imprisonment 
for those engaged in corruption
59.3 % 96.0 % 38.0 % 62.4 %
Public information about the activities 
of public bodies and the cost of 
budget expenditure from taxation
41.3 % 26.0 % 26.0 % 35.2 %
Information about investigations into 
corruption cases
28.0 % 34.0 % 16.0 % 26.8 %
Conducting campaigns directed 
toward focusing public attention on 
corruption and estimates of its real 
cost for society
36.0 % 34.0 % 18.0 % 32.0 %
Assertion and observance of a 
professional code of ethics
38.0 % 10.0 % 18.0 % 26.8 %
Actualization of moral and ethical 
values in society
54.0 % 86.0 % 48.0 % 59.2 %
Increase of the wages of civil 
servants/public offi cials
38.0 % 14.0 % 24.0 % 30.4 %
Granting to citizens the possibility of 
reporting corruption to the authorities
38.0 % 64.0 % 32.0 % 42.0 %
Protection of citizens who speak out 
against corruption
37.3 % 42.0 % 38.0 % 38.4 %
Creation of a special state body for 
the fi ght against corruption in the 
power sector
52.7 % 42.0 % 38.0 % 47.6 %
Business activity directed toward the 
fi ght against corruption
22.0 % 2.0 % 14.0 % 16.4 %
4.6 Conclusions
Uniting the interview results along with the interviewers’ observations, it is possible to come to 
the conclusion that the owners of houses have serious grounds to be dissatisfi ed by the quality of 
housing and municipal services provided to them; indeed apartment houses infrastructure is in a 
relatively poor condition. A solution to the problem of providing 24-hour water, heat and power is an 
especially pressing need. At the same time, in spite of dissatisfaction by the quality of housing and 
municipal services, homeowners rarely turn to the suppliers of these services with their complaints. 
This is because they consider these problems will not be solved, or because of unsatisfactory staff 
attitudes towards the houses’ inhabitants.
The average size of a bribe in the HME of a large Ukrainian city is 10-100 UAH (US$2-20). The 
inhabitants of Kherson faced requests for bribes in the provision of services most frequently; 
inhabitants of Kyiv and Rivne experienced such requests more rarely. On the other hand, Kyivians 
pay bribes to the suppliers of housing and municipal services only once per year on average, while 
for most of the inhabitants of Kherson and Rivne it is necessary to pay such bribes monthly.
Most citizens take the word ‘corruption’ to mean the use of an offi cial position for an individual’s 
own needs. In Kyiv, corruption is most frequently understood to mean paying a bribe to a civil 
servant, while in Rivne it is obtaining a fee for services that should be provided free of charge. Such 
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differences tend to be the result of the kinds of corruption inhabitants of one or other region face 
most frequently. Cases of corruption occur most frequently when people are obtaining permissions, 
licenses, certifi cations and other documents, and in having repair work carried out.
In the opinion of respondents, housing administrations, water and heat services, suppliers of electric 
power (in Kherson) and local authorities (in Rivne) are most likely to be corrupt. The inhabitants of 
Kyiv indicated corruption of all suppliers of housing and municipal services without exception.
Low earnings, greediness for money, human nature, and the possibility of avoiding punishment 
for corrupt behaviour are acknowledged to be the main reasons for corruption. In this case study, 
corruption has more fi nancial roots for the inhabitants of the capital, while the inhabitants of 
provincial cities look towards more moral and ethical reasons.
In terms of effective anti-corruption methods or strategies, respondents recognized only the pursuit 
and prolonged imprisonment of those engaged in corrupt activity, along with the actualization of 
moral and ethical standards in society. The inhabitants of Kherson also noted the expediency 
of granting to citizens the possibility of reporting corruption to the authorities, while Kyivians 
believed the creation of a special state body to fi ght against corruption in the power sector would 
be effective.
The low quality of the services provided by workers in the HME means homeowners need to 
turn to them frequently with requests remedy defi ciencies in their work, to repair malfunctions, 
to export rubbish, to clean canalization or drainage, to ensure illumination of streets, to supply 
water and so on. Obviously, attempts by HME workers to obtain bribes for the fulfi llment of such 
works or assignment of services takes place here. The unsatisfactory condition of housing and 
municipal services, houses and the territories around them demonstrates either: 1) that failure to 
obtain a bribe has caused HME workers not to fulfi ll their professional responsibilities in general 
or to do so in an improper way; or 2) payment of a bribe has failed to infl uence the fulfi llment of 
HME workers’ professional responsibilities in any way. After paying a bribe, the majority of the 
homeowners interviewed felt such negative emotions as powerlessness, fear, confusion and ill will. 
From this should be drawn the conclusion that corruption in the HMEs of large Ukrainian cities is a 
major problem that is fi nancial, moral and ethical, and lawful in nature; in addition, it is preventing 
the proper material and technical development of the region.
4.7 Analysis of semi-structured interviews for infrastructure service 
providers
A comparative analysis of infrastructure service providers in different cities of Ukraine has shown 
that in general the situation in the sectors of ethics, procurement, human resources and corruption 
are quite similar. During the study 8 ZHEKs and 4 infrastructure companies-monopolists (gas 
supplier, energy supplier, water and heating suppliers) in each of the cities were interviewed, thus 
a total 24 ZHEKs and 12 infrastructure providers were interviewed. Large Ukrainian companies 
(such as Ukrgaz, a company that supplies energy (oblenergo), water (Vodokanal) and heating 
(teploenergo)) have their own code of conduct for staff; ZHEKs (the local residential utilities offi ces) 
also have job descriptions. All these documents help to prevent corruption, but in most cases 
,whilst personnel know about these documents they do not follow them and do not consider them 
strict guidelines. In cases of corruption being reported, the fact that an individual’s job description 
has been violated provides grounds for taking appropriate measures. Complaints procedures are 
present in all organizations, although people rarely use them in Rivne and Kherson (see Table 7).
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Table 7. Existence of a complaints offi ce
Is there a complaints offi ce? 
Is it known?  Is it used?
Number of respondents 
selecting this answer
Respondents
Yes No
Kyiv 10 2
Rivne 2 10
Kherson 3 9
Although there are some exceptions (for example, the companies that collect waste in Kyiv), it is 
possible to state that in general in Ukraine there is a monopoly for infrastructure services delivery 
as regional branches of big service delivery companies are present in all cities. This explains the 
uniformity in procurement, hiring, discipline and staff motivation in such companies. The list of 
budgeted services (services which are provided by ZHEKs and which are defi ned by the Ministry 
of the Housing and Municipal Services and are fi nanced from state budget) was formed quite 
a long time ago, and the public did not participate in its preparation. In addition, in spite of the 
fact that tariffs on housing and communal services are set by local authorities, and the system of 
support for poor people via grants allocation (in the form of a discount on payments for communal 
services), any questions surrounding payment of debts or debts restructuring are solved by the 
central authority only – ie, the Cabinet of Ministers (see Table 8). 
Table 8. Public availability of regulations and policy guidelines
Are regulations and policy guidelines publicly 
available?
Number of respondents 
selecting this answer
Respondents
Yes No
Kyiv 10 2
Rivne 10 2
Kherson 6 6
The organizations interviewed did not have any obligations to combat corruption or separate anti-
corruption regulations, except via job descriptions, their codes of conduct and current legislation. In 
addition, there were no incentives for staff members to report attempts to bribe them. A majority of 
the respondents in Kyiv and Kherson had not reported any cases of bribes; in Rivne 50 per cent of 
respondents were aware of these cases and 50 per cent were not. 
As to sanctions for accepting bribes, these were almost the same in all cities – i.e. penalties and 
dismissal in cases of repeated bribe acceptance.
A majority of respondents from infrastructure services providers in the cities thought that in order 
to fi ght corruption in housing and the communal sector, it is necessary to increase fi nancing of that 
sector and to prosecute for acceptance of bribes; only in Kyiv did respondents suggest creating 
market conditions for the delivery of services and hiring young managers (see Table 9).
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Table 9. Improvements to decrease corruption
What 
improvements 
could you 
suggest 
to current 
arrangements?
Answers Respondents 
Kyiv
Better fi nancing in the sector
Prosecuting corruption cases
Salary increases
Changes in management
Introduction of market conditions for service delivery
4
3
2
2
1
Rivne
Tougher punishment 
Better fi nancing in the sector
Salary increases 
NGO involvement 
4
4
3
1
Kherson
Better fi nancing in the sector  
Tougher punishment 
Salary increases
6
4
2
In terms of answers to the question about the existence of NGOs or other independent actors that 
monitor services, the respondents mentioned the Offi ce for Consumers Rights Protection and audit 
companies, but none of these organizations are NGOs. 
The situation is quite different in Kyiv, where the index of reactions to information about corruption 
is higher, the number of complaints is greater, where competitive principles for tendering exist (for 
example, there is the possibility for ZHEKs to choose a company – as with waste collection), where 
special training on integrity issues is provided for staff and where the situation became better after 
the last presidential elections (2004) (see Table. 10).
Table 10. Provision of specifi c training on integrity issues
Do you provide specifi c training on integrity 
issues?
Number of respondents 
selecting this answer
Answers
Yes No
Kyiv 8 4
Rivne 6 6
Kherson 2 10
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This situation can be explained by the fact that in Kyiv city people are more aware of their rights, 
are more active in protection of those rights and this forces companies to take measures to combat 
corruption. 
4.8 Focus groups discussions analysis
4.8.1 Service delivery
During the discussion on service delivery issues, the system was found to be characterized as 
follows: 
the system of service delivery is clear
service delivery takes place through monopoly supply
service delivery (except in Kyiv) is low quality, especially concerning hot water supply and the 
quality of drinking water
the existence of bribery in the sector
absence of reforms in the sector
non-transparency in terms of rates defi nition for services
The situation around informal/illegal residential areas was hard to comment upon as these places 
are fragmented and are not adapted to residential use, thus services are not provided there.
In Ukraine (except in Kyiv, where the situation is better) there are big problems connected with 
the quality of delivered services. The main areas suffering low quality are the provision of heating, 
hot water supply, waste collection and the quality of drinking water. Gas and energy supplies are 
quite stable and of acceptable quality. Poor service quality is caused by: the lack of a competitive 
market for infrastructure services delivery; imperfections in the regulatory system for control of 
natural monopolies; the high level of infrastructure depreciation (30-85 per cent); and as a result of 
frequent interruptions in service delivery. It is also necessary to note that the sector does not tend 
to attract investment and the lack of investment projects as a result. 
In cases of problems, consumers of services usually speak to the ZHEKs. Only where it is necessary 
to get approvals (e.g. for renovations, constructions etc.) do they go directly to the representatives 
of infrastructure service providers (the gas supply offi ce, energy supply offi ce etc).
There are not so many local communities and they are not involved in infrastructure service delivery. 
Until recent times the activity of the public was quite insignifi cant in the sector of service delivery; 
however, following a rise in tariffs (by 2-4 times) in 2006, there were strong public protests against 
this policy and the rates were reduced. 
Infrastructure service providers do not have the trust of the people, especially concerning tariffs and 
the quality of drinking water. 
4.8.2 Corruption 
In most cases, the resolution of problems is delayed or is explained by the lack of fi nancing. As a 
result, citizens are forced to give bribes to offi cials to solve problems. In other cases, resolution may 
be either delayed for long periods or may be a low-quality solution.
The level of a bribe depends on the city and service description and can vary a lot: from US$1 
for small repair work to several hundreds of dollars to get reduced rates for rent and up to tens of 
thousands of dollars to get a place for construction. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Usually, citizens give bribes in cases of need – for example, while applying for a discount on 
services (a subsidy) or for getting permission of any kind. The frequency of bribes depends on the 
needs citizen have. It is possible to avoid bribing if the problem is solved through acquaintances 
or through not to give any bribes on principle. In the latter case, this can delay the resolution of the 
problem for an indefi nite time. 
The members of the focus groups highlighted the following causes of corruption:
Absence of reforms in housing and the municipal industry of Ukraine, which has lead to the 
absence of incentives in current legislation and the local authority not being interested in fostering 
a competitive environment by establishing housing associations/co-ownership unions;
Absence of incentives for involvement of private persons and small enterprises in the sector of 
infrastructure service delivery;
Extremely low fi nancing of the sector and a lack of specialists who could have lead to the 
reforms taking place (especially at the local level); and
Underdeveloped civil society organizations and the resulting low impact the local community 
has on the resolution problems.
Legal advocacy agencies being in a position to detect corruption is complicated by the following 
factors: 
insuffi cient co-operation by legal advocacy agencies with the population, in particular, as in 
terms of carrying out public information activities and establishing informational communication 
with the population;
the population being unprepared to co-operate with legal advocacy agencies;
ineffi cient preventive activity carried out by legal advocacy agencies, as well as ineffi cient 
integrated operations aimed at detecting corruption;
lack of adequate legislative regulations for checking statements and notifi cations about offenses; 
and
the lack of an agency the competence of which would include generating a unifi ed anti-corruption 
policy based on corruption risks-analysis.
It is necessary to emphasize the successful instances of combating corruption in Kyiv, a result 
of direct communication between the city authority and citizens wishing to contribute. Regular 
meetings with the public in 2006 led to an increased number of complaints about offi cials and 
corruption (up to 10,000 each month).
In order to support new managers in deciding to follow an integrity policy, there is a point in their 
contracts that says they will get a bonus of 10 per cent of profi ts if they promote the integrity policy 
and hire honest employees.
One more step to combat corruption in terms of budget distribution is to conduct reforms that 
promote local self-governance. Local budget allocation and distribution within the region would 
reduce the possibilities for corruption on the part of offi cials from the central authority. 
The implementation of ‘hot lines’ by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which should have helped in the 
reporting of corruption, was not found to be particularly effi cient. The researchers thought that this 
was due to a low level of trust by the public of agencies of internal affairs. 
It is necessary to point out that the causes of corruption in infrastructure service delivery are not 
possible to discuss without understanding causes of corruption in Ukraine in general. The true fi ght 
against corruption is not a PR activity or simply the application of political pressure. It is necessary 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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not only declare the importance of this issue for the country, but also to make real steps towards 
reforms in the administrative and legal systems, healthcare and education, to initiate changes in 
election law, and to provide transparency of the budget process and in the activities of the state 
monopolies. Anti-corruption activity is comprehensive and should be aimed at its prevention and 
further distribution.
At the same time, analysis of the latest state conception to combat corruption (announced in 
November 2006, includes 6 draft laws among which 3 have been adopted by the Parliament and 
3 are still under consideration) showed that the authors of that programme did not understand 
modern anti-corruption ideology; nor did they seem to want to avoid old retaliatory approaches to 
corruption elimination. It is necessary to combat the causes of corruption, not its consequences. 
Nowadays in Ukrainian society ideas on the prevalence and admissibility of corruption in Ukraine, 
and on the inability of law enforcement bodies to fi ght effectively against this phenomenon, are 
rooted quite deeply. Such a situation requires not only improved legislation and additional imperous 
efforts directed at fi ghting against corruption, but also signifi cant ideological work in order to 
change public opinions. Components of this work are social and economic growth in Ukrainian 
society, development of civil society organizations and the formation of an anti-corruption public 
consciousness.
After the last presidential elections, Ukraine failed to prosecute those who violated anti-corruption 
laws. The main reason for this was the close connection between this kind of prosecution and political 
activity. The mix of criminal charges and political activity led to avoidance of fair punishment. 
4.8.3 Livelihoods 
Members of focus groups reckon that corruption in infrastructure service delivery should be divided 
into two groups:
First group – here corruption is connected with the calculation of rates for housing and communal 
services, including rent rates, and with the unsatisfactory quality of services delivered. This kind 
of corruption (which has became quite topical in recent times) has a signifi cant infl uence on the 
fi nancial situation of city residents and their access to essential infrastructure services, including 
threats to life in case of emergencies and their level of confi dence in society. 
Second group – here corruption (with some exceptions) is mostly a common type and does not 
lead to fi nancial threats to the state, because it is quite insignifi cant for its budget. However, 
being systematic, such corruption infl uences the level of confi dence in the state authority. 
None of the members of the focus groups admitted to receiving any privileges from corruption 
themselves.
•
•
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5. Methods of reform in the delivery of housing and 
municipal services
Based on the above analysis of the condition of housing and municipal services in the context 
of fi ghting corruption, it is possible to provide the following recommendations:
The main causes of corruption are the low level of economic freedom in Ukraine, the 
absence of competition and monopoly supply in the housing and municipal services area. 
Therefore it is necessary to carry out an effective and socially-focused state policy, which 
should be directed towards restricting monopolies and developing sound competition; and 
to create a competitive environment for municipal services through the development and 
acceptance of normative documents enabling commercial companies to enter into the 
market for those services.
It is also necessary to establish state control over tariffs, to make the delivery of housing 
and municipal services economically viable.
Central government should create an uniform Internet website allowing those responsible 
for budgetary funds to conduct and be informed about tender purchases of goods and 
services in housing and municipal services.
Government should introduce a system of higher tariffs for use of heat, gas and water 
over a certain specifi ed limit.
Government and local self-governance bodies and housing and municipal enterprises 
should be obliged to adhere severely to the requirements of chapters 22, 46, 47, 48 of 
the Constitution and legislations of Ukraine concerning the minimum living wage and the 
state social guarantees.
There should be constant monitoring of the housing and municipal sector to reveal 
instances of illegal abuse and to react to such instances appropriately.
It is necessary to drop claims against needy citizens as regards infringements of 
requirements of the Constitution, the law ‘About a Living Wage’ and civil legislation of 
Ukraine.
There should be severe public control of the housing and municipal services sector 
involving a broad audience of human rights organizations and independent public workers, 
who should co-ordinate the actions with proper state bodies.
It is important to initiate an active and extensive project to explain to citizens the 
constitutional laws and freedoms and current legislations of Ukraine, to acquaint them 
with effective means of legal protection and to realize control of local communities over 
housing and municipal services at all levels.
Finally, government should introduce fi nancial mechanisms for the introduction of energy 
savings in apartments (interest-free, commodity credits, etc.), and should create special 
city funds to encourage energy savings.
Local authorities defi ne the most effi cient anti-corruption measures based on pecularities of 
their regions. For instance, the city executive authority of Ivano-Frankivsk (Westen Ukraine) 
uses the following measures to overcome corruption in the city:
Simplifi cation of the grants receiving procedure for housing and municipal services 
payment;
•
•
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Demonopolization of services in housing and communal services ;
Organization of work of an Information Centre for municipal services;
Creation of co-owners unions and house committees; and
Continuation of the release of information bulletins concerning the work of enterprises providing 
housing and municipal services in the city.
With the purpose of reducing levels of corruption in the housing and municipal sector, Pechersk 
Regional Administration of Kyiv city has created a competitive environment on the basis of state 
housing-operation offi ces. Now the inhabitants of any house who are not satisfi ed with the work of 
a housing-operation offi ce, can change their service provider for better one. Hoever, suppliers of 
heat and water in Kyiv city are monopolists that sign agreements with housing-operation offi ces. 
They are then responsible for the quality of housing-operation offi ces’ services, which do not have 
any real infl uence over these monopolies. Hence the private housing-operation offi ces in Pechersk 
area have not had a positive impact. Therefore, the regional authority has gone on some way to 
granting legal and economic independence to housing-operation offi ces. They receive payment for 
particular services. The step now should be to include establishment of optimum tariffs covering, 
for example, expenses for waste removal.
•
•
•
•
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6. Summary of the report
1.  Considerable attention is currently paid to controlling corruption in Ukrain. The Decree of 
the President of Ukraine ‘On the Concept of Eliminating Corruption in Ukraine ‘Towards 
Integrity’, dated 11 September 2006, states that corruption is a problem that requires 
immediate response. It represents a signifi cant threat to democracy, implementation of 
the right supremacy principle, social progress, national security and the formation of civic 
society. The Concept outlines ways of ensuring integrity at the level of public and local 
authorities and ways of strengthening the role of civic society and the mass media in 
revealing and preventing corruption.
 To implement the objectives outlined in the Concept, the Parliament of Ukraine submitted 
a set of bills, including:
‘On Ratifying the Convention Against Corruption of the United Nations 
Organization’7;
‘On Ratifying the Criminal Convention on Corruption Control’8;
‘On Corruption Prevention and Control Principles’;
‘On Proposing Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Corruption 
Responsibility’.
2.  Analysis of current legislation shows that there are no normative acts that unambiguously 
outline what constitutes a corrupt action in economic activity.
3.  In the opinion of city inhabitants, the main reasons for corruption are: the low level of 
salaries (20.4 per cent), greed (13.6 per cent), peculiarities of the national psyche (13.2 
per cent) and the possibility of avoiding punishment for corrupt actions (12.8 per cent). 
The most effi cient anti-corruption measures that should be taken are tougher sanctions 
for corruption (62.4 per cent of respondents) and actualization of moral and ethical norms 
in the society (59.2 per cent).
4.  All regions of Ukraine experience exaggerated reporting of required versus actual services 
delivered, distorted levels of service quality, non-transparent procedures for establishing 
tariffs, numerous write-ups in payment calculations, as well as other types of systematic 
illegal abuses. Nevertheless, these facts – which unambiguously point to the presence of 
organized and socially dangerous crimes in the housing and communal services sector 
– have drawn the attention of neither the public, local authorities nor competent agencies, 
unless such activities are carried out by rival polical parties.
5.  Legal prosecution of low-income citizens for so-called ‘debts’ by housing and municipal 
services providers is a problem as well. As a rule, not having signed contracts with citizens 
on provision of the services these organizations succeed in satisfying their judicial claims. 
At the same time, there are numerous cases of violation of judgement principles as well 
as of the procedure established by the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine. 
•
•
•
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7  On October 18, 2006 the Parliament of Ukraine ratifi ed the Convention against Corruption of the United 
Nations Organization; 
8  On October 18, 2006 the Parliament of Ukraine ratifi ed the  Additional Protocol to Criminal Convention on 
Corruption Combat
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6.  Among the main reasons of corruption is the low level of economic freedom in the state, lack of 
competition and monopoly provision within housing and municipal infrastructure services. This is 
why a state policy aimed at restraining monopolies and developing sound competition should be 
enacted, so generating a competitive environment for providing housing and municipal services. 
This may be achieved through the elaboration and approval of normative documents to enable 
commercial companies to enter into the market for services delivery.
7.  In order to protect their rights and create competitive conditions for infrastructure service delivery, 
citizens should initiate the foundation of co-ownership unions.
8.  One more important cause of corruption is the underdeveloped nature of civil society organizations 
and the resulting low impact of the local community on the resolution of problems.
9.  All uncovered corrupt actions should be brought before the courts, and any instances of corrupt 
individuals evading justice should be considered a failure of the authorities in combatting 
corruption.
